Efficient Proofs of Retrievability with Public Verifiability for Dynamic
  Cloud Storage by Sengupta, Binanda & Ruj, Sushmita
ar
X
iv
:1
61
1.
03
98
2v
6 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 A
ug
 20
18
Efficient Proofs of Retrievability with Public Verifiability
for Dynamic Cloud Storage⋆
Binanda Sengupta and Sushmita Ruj
Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India
{binanda r,sush}@isical.ac.in
Abstract. Cloud service providers offer various facilities to their clients. The clients with limited
resources opt for some of these facilities. They can outsource their bulk data to the cloud server.
The cloud server maintains these data in lieu of monetary benefits. However, a malicious cloud
server might delete some of these data to save some space and offer this extra amount of storage to
another client. Therefore, the client might not retrieve her file (or some portions of it) as often as
needed. Proofs of retrievability (POR) provide an assurance to the client that the server is actually
storing all of her data appropriately and they can be retrieved at any point of time. In a dynamic
POR scheme, the client can update her data after she uploads them to the cloud server. Moreover,
in publicly verifiable POR schemes, the client can delegate her auditing task to some third party
specialized for this purpose. In this work, we exploit the homomorphic hashing technique to design
a publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme that is more efficient (in terms of bandwidth required
between the client and the server) than the “state-of-the-art” publicly verifiable dynamic POR
scheme. We also analyze security and performance of our scheme.
Keywords: Cloud storage, auditing, proofs of retrievability, dynamic data, public verifiability
1 Introduction
In the age of cloud computing, cloud servers with adequate resources help their clients by performing
huge amount of computation or by storing large amount of data (say, in the order of terabytes) on
their behalf. In this setting, a client only has to download the result of the computation or has to read
(or update) the required portion of the outsourced data. Several storage service providers like Amazon
Simple Storage Service (S3), Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft Azure provide storage outsourcing
facility to their clients (data owners). However, a cloud storage server can be malicious and delete some
(less frequently accessed) part of the client’s data in order to save space. Secure cloud storage protocols
(two-party protocols between the client and the server) provide a cryptographic solution to this problem
by ensuring that the client’s data are stored untampered in the cloud server.
In a secure cloud storage scheme, a client can remotely check the integrity of her data file outsourced to
the cloud server. A possible way to do this is to divide the data file into blocks and attach an authenticator
(or tag) to each of these blocks before the initial outsourcing. When the client wants to check the integrity
of her data, she downloads all the blocks of the file along with their tags from the server and verifies
them individually. However, this process is highly inefficient due to the large communication bandwidth
required between the client and the cloud server.
In order to resolve the issue mentioned above, a notion called proofs-of-storage comes into play where
the client can audit her data file stored in the server without accessing the whole file, and still, be able
to detect an unwanted modification of the file done by the malicious server. The concept of provable data
possession (PDP) is introduced by Ateniese et al. [2] where the client computes an authentication tag
for each block of her data file and uploads the file along with these authentication tags as stated earlier.
Later, the client can execute an audit protocol and verify the integrity of the data file by checking only
a predefined number of randomly sampled blocks of the file.
⋆ A version of the paper with the same title has been published in IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing
(DOI: 10.1109/TCC.2017.2767584). The final publication is available in IEEE Xplore.
Although efficient PDP schemes [2,19,46,45] are available in the literature, they only provide the
guarantee of retrievability of almost all blocks of the data file. We briefly mention some situations where
this guarantee is not sufficient. The data file may contain some sensitive information (e.g., accounting
information) any part of which the client does not want to lose. On the other hand, a corruption in the
compression table of an outsourced compressed file might make the whole file unavailable. In a searchable
symmetric encryption scheme [14], the client encrypts a database using a symmetric encryption scheme
to form an index (metadata for that database) [22] and outsources the encrypted documents along with
the index to the server. The size of this index is very small compared to the encrypted database itself.
However, loss of the index completely defeats the purpose of the searchable encryption scheme. In such
circumstances, the client wants a stronger notion than PDP which would guarantee that the server has
stored the entire file properly and the client can retrieve all of her data blocks at any point of time.
To address the issue mentioned above, Juels and Kaliski [28] introduce proofs of retrievability (POR)
where the data file outsourced to the server can be retrieved in its entirety by the client. The underlying
idea [41] of a POR scheme is to encode the original data file with an error-correcting code, authenticate
the blocks of the encoded file with tags and upload them on the storage server. As in PDP schemes, the
client can execute an audit protocol to check the integrity of the outsourced data file. The use of error-
correcting codes ensures that all data blocks of the file are retrievable. Depending on the nature of the
outsourced data, POR schemes are classified as: POR schemes for static data (static POR) and dynamic
data (dynamic POR). For static data, the client cannot change her data after the initial outsourcing
(suitable mostly for backup or archival data). Dynamic data are more generic in that the client can
modify her data as often as needed. The POR schemes are publicly verifiable if audits can be performed
by any third party auditor (TPA) with the knowledge of public parameters only; they are privately
verifiable if only the client (data owner) with some secret information can perform audits.
Designing an efficient and publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme is an important research problem
due to its practical applications. There are various efficiency parameters where the performance of a
dynamic POR scheme might be improved. Some of them include the communication bandwidth required
to read or write a data block (or to perform an audit), the client’s storage, and the computational cost
at the client’s (or the server’s) end. On the other hand, the client often prefers to delegate the auditing
task to a third party auditor (TPA) who performs audits on the client’s data and informs the client in
case of any anomaly detected in the server’s behavior.
Shi et al. [42] propose two efficient dynamic POR schemes: one with private verifiability and another
with public verifiability. In this work, we provide a construction of a publicly verifiable dynamic POR
scheme that is more efficient (in terms of write and audit costs) than the publicly verifiable scheme
proposed by Shi et al. [42]. Moreover, the public parameters used in the latter scheme need to be
changed for each write operation performed on the client’s data which is clearly an overhead as, in that
case, these public parameters are to be validated and certified for every write.
Our Contribution We summarize our contributions in this paper as follows.
– We construct a dynamic proofs-of-retrievability (POR) scheme where the client outsources her data
file to the cloud server and she can update the content of the file later. Our construction is based on
the homomorphic hashing technique.
– Our dynamic POR scheme offers public verifiability, that is, the client can delegate the auditing task
to a third party auditor who performs audits on the client’s behalf.
– We show that our scheme is secure in the sense that the client gets an assurance that her data file
stored by the server is authentic and up-to-date, and all the data blocks can be retrieved by the
client as often as needed.
– We analyze the performance of our scheme and compare it with other existing dynamic POR schemes
(having private or public verifiability).
– Our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme enjoys more efficiency (in terms of communication
bandwidths required for a write and an audit) than the “state-of-the-art” publicly verifiable dynamic
POR scheme [42]. Moreover, unlike the latter scheme, there is no need to validate or certify the public
parameters in our scheme for every write operation as they are fixed since the initial setup phase.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the preliminaries and background
related to our work. In Section 3, we survey the existing literature on secure cloud storage schemes.
Section 4 provides a detailed construction of our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme. We analyze
the security of our scheme in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the performance of our scheme
and compare our scheme with other existing dynamic POR schemes based on different parameters (shown
in Table 1). We also show that our scheme is more efficient than the publicly verifiable dynamic POR
scheme proposed by Shi et al. [42]. In the concluding Section 7, we summarize the work done in this
paper.
2 Preliminaries and Background
2.1 Notation
We take λ to be the security parameter. An algorithm denoted by A(1λ) is a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm when its running time is polynomial in λ and its output y is a random variable which
depends on the internal coin tosses of A. If A is given access to an oracle O, we denote A by AO also.
An element a chosen uniformly at random from a set S is denoted as a
R
←− S. A function f : N → R is
called negligible in λ if for all positive integers c and for all sufficiently large λ, we have f(λ) < 1
λc
.
2.2 Erasure Code
A (m˜, n˜, d)Σ-erasure code [37,29] is an error-correcting code [31] that comprises an encoding algorithm
Enc: Σn˜ → Σm˜ (encodes a message consisting of n˜ symbols into a longer codeword consisting of m˜
symbols) and a decoding algorithm Dec: Σm˜ → Σn˜ (decodes a codeword to a message), where Σ is a
finite alphabet and d is the minimum distance (Hamming distance between any two codewords is at least
d) of the code. The quantity n˜
m˜
is called the rate of the code. A (m˜, n˜, d)Σ-erasure code can tolerate up
to d − 1 erasures. If d = m˜ − n˜ + 1, we call the code a maximum distance separable (MDS) code. For
an MDS code, the original message can be reconstructed from any n˜ out of m˜ symbols of the codeword.
Reed-Solomon codes [38] and their extensions are examples of non-trivial MDS codes.
2.3 Merkle Hash Tree
A Merkle hash tree [33] is a binary tree where each leaf-node stores a data item. The label of each leaf-
node is the data item stored in the node itself. A collision-resistant hash function hCR is used to label the
intermediate nodes of the tree. Each of the outputs of hCR on different inputs is a binary string of length
O(λ). The label of a intermediate node v is the output of hCR computed on the labels of the children
nodes of v. A Merkle hash tree is used as a standard tool for efficient memory-checking. Fig. 1 shows a
A
hCR(hCR(hCR(d1, d2), hCR(d3, d4)), hCR(hCR(d5, d6), hCR(d7, d8)))
B
hCR(hCR(d1, d2), hCR(d3, d4))
D
hCR(d1, d2)
H
d1
I
d2
E
hCR(d3, d4)
J
d3
K
d4
C
hCR(hCR(d5, d6), hCR(d7, d8))
F
hCR(d5, d6)
L
d5
M
d6
G
hCR(d7, d8)
N
d7
O
d8
Fig. 1. A Merkle hash tree containing data items {d1, d2, . . . , d8}.
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Merkle hash tree containing the data items {d1, d2, . . . , d8} stored at the leaf-nodes. Consequently, the
labels of the intermediate nodes are computed using the hash function hCR. The hash value of the node
A is the root-digest. The proof showing that a data item d is present in the tree consists of the data item
d and the labels of the nodes along the associated path (the sequence of siblings of the node containing
the data item d). For example, a proof showing that d3 is present in the tree consists of {d3, (d4, lD, lC)},
where d4, lD and lC are the labels of the nodes K,D and C, respectively. Given such a proof, a verifier
computes the hash value of the root. The verifier outputs accept if the computed hash value matches
with the root-digest; it outputs reject, otherwise. The size of a proof is logarithmic in the number of
data items stored in the leaf-nodes of the tree.
Due to the collision-resistance property of hCR, it is infeasible (except with some probability negligible
in the security parameter λ) to add or modify a data item in the Merkle hash tree without changing its
root-digest.
2.4 Digital Signature Scheme
Diffie and Hellman introduce the public-key cryptography and the notion of digital signatures in their
seminal paper “New Directions in Cryptography” [16]. Rivest et al. propose the first digital signature
scheme based on the RSA assumption[40]. Boneh et al. [9] introduce the first signature scheme where
the signatures are short (e.g., such a signature of size 160 bits provides the security comparable to that
of a 1024-bit RSA signature). The DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) [36] and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm) [27] signature schemes (variants of the ElGamal signature scheme [18]) are
widely used in practice.
A digital signature scheme consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms: a key generation
algorithm KeyGen, a signing algorithm Sign and a verification algorithm Verify. KeyGen takes as input
the security parameter λ and outputs a pair of keys (psk, ssk), where ssk is the secret key and psk is
the corresponding public verification key. Algorithm Sign takes a message m from the message space M
and the secret key ssk as input and outputs a signature σ. Algorithm Verify takes as input the public
key psk, a message m and a signature σ, and outputs accept or reject depending upon whether the
signature is valid or not. Any of these algorithms can be probabilistic in nature. The correctness and
security (existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks [24]) of a digital signature
scheme are described as follows.
1. Correctness : Algorithm Verify always accepts a signature generated by an honest signer, that is,
Pr[Verifypsk(m, Sign(ssk,m)) = accept] = 1.
2. Security: Let Signssk(·) be the signing oracle and A be any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
with an oracle access to Signssk(·). The adversary A adaptively makes polynomial number of sign
queries to Signssk(·) for different messages and gets back the signatures on those messages. The
signature scheme is secure if A cannot produce, except with some probability negligible in λ, a
valid signature on a message not queried previously, that is, for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary ASignssk(·), the following probability
Pr[(m,σ)← ASignssk(·)(psk) : m 6∈ Qs ∧ Verifypsk(m,σ) = accept]
is negligible in λ, where Qs is the set of sign queries made by A to Signssk(·). The probability is
taken over the internal coin tosses of A.
2.5 Discrete Logarithm Assumption
The discrete logarithm problem [32,7] over a multiplicative groupGq = 〈g〉 of prime order q and generated
by g is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given y ∈ Gq, the discrete logarithm problem over
Gq is to compute x ∈ Zq such that y = g
x.
4
Fig. 2. The entities involved in a dynamic POR scheme. The client (data owner) processes the data file F to
form another file F ′ and outsources it to the cloud storage server. She can later read or write the outsourced
data. For a privately verifiable scheme, the client performs audits on her data. For a publicly verifiable scheme,
she can delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor who performs audits on behalf of the client.
The discrete logarithm assumption over Gq says that, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A(1λ), the probability
Pr
x
R
←−Zq
[x← A(y) : y = gx]
is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of A and the random choice
of x.
2.6 Dynamic Proofs of Retrievability
We define a proofs-of-retrievability scheme for dynamic data as follows [12,42].
Definition 2 (Dynamic POR). A dynamic POR scheme consists of the following protocols between
two stateful parties: a client (data owner) and a server.
– Init(1λ, n, β, F ): This protocol associates a random file-identifier fid to the data file F consisting of
n data blocks each of β bits, and it outputs the client state stateC and another file F
′ to be stored by
the server.
– Read(i, F ′, stateC , fid): This protocol outputs the data block at the i-th location of the current state
of the file or abort.
– Write(i, updtype, B, F ′, stateC , fid): This protocol inserts the block B after the i-th block of the file
or sets i-th block of the file to B or deletes the i-th block of the file (B is null in this case) based on
the value of the variable updtype. It outputs updated (F˜ ′, s˜tateC) or abort.
– Audit(F ′, stateC , fid): This protocol checks memory contents of the current state of the data file and
outputs 1 or 0.
A dynamic POR scheme is privately verifiable if only the client with some secret information can perform
an audit, that is, stateC is secret. Otherwise, it is publicly verifiable. For a publicly verifiable dynamic
POR scheme, a third party auditor (TPA) can audit the client’s data on behalf of the client who delegates
her auditing task to the TPA. In this case, we use the term “verifier” to denote an auditor who can be
the TPA or the client herself. Fig. 2 shows the entities involved in a dynamic POR scheme. Security of
a dynamic POR scheme is described in Section 5.
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2.7 Homomorphic Hash Function
A homomorphic hash function h : Fm → Gq (for a finite field F and a multiplicative group Gq of
prime order q) is defined as a collision-resistant hash function satisfying the following two properties:
1) for vectors u, v ∈ Fm and scalars α, β ∈ F, it holds that h(αu + βv) = h(u)α · h(v)β , and 2) it is
computationally hard to find vectors u, v ∈ Fm (u 6= v) such that h(u) = h(v).
Krohn et al. [30] construct a homomorphic hash function in the context of content distribution. The
construction is similar to that proposed in incremental hashing schemes [5]. Let Gq be a multiplicative
group of prime order q. Let m elements (generators) g1, g2, . . . , gm be selected randomly from Gq. Then,
the homomorphic hash of a vector u = [u1, u2, . . . , um] ∈ Z
m
q is defined as h(u) =
∏m
i=1 gi
ui . The
hash function thus constructed is homomorphic, and the collision-resistance property is derived from
the discrete logarithm assumption over Gq. We use this construction in our dynamic POR scheme to
generate authentication tags for data blocks (see Section 4.2).
3 Related Work
Ateniese et al. [2] introduce the notion of provable data possession (PDP). In a PDP scheme, the client
computes an authentication tag (e.g., message authentication code [6]) for each block of her data file
and uploads the file along with the authentication tags. During an audit protocol, the client samples
a predefined number of random block-indices and sends them to the server (challenge phase). The
cardinality of the challenge set is typically taken to be O(λ), where λ is the security parameter. Depending
upon the challenge, the server does some computations over the stored data and sends a proof to the
client (response phase). Finally, the client checks the integrity of her data based on this proof (verification
phase). Almost all data blocks can be retrieved from a (possibly malicious) server passing an audit with
a non-negligible probability. Other PDP schemes include [3,19,46,45,15].
Juels and Kaliski [28] introduce proofs of retrievability (POR) for static data (Naor and Rothblum [35]
give a similar idea for sublinear authenticators). According to Shacham and Waters [41], the retrievability
guarantee for all data blocks of the outsourced file can be achieved by encoding the original file with an
erasure code (see Section 2.2) before authenticating (and uploading) the blocks of the encoded file. Due
to the redundancy added to the data blocks, the server has to delete or modify a considerable number of
blocks to actually delete or modify a data block which makes it difficult for the server to pass an audit.
Following the work by Juels and Kaliski, several POR schemes have been proposed for static data
(static POR) and dynamic data (dynamic POR). Shacham and Waters [41] propose two POR schemes for
static data (one with private verifiability and another with public verifiability) where the response from
the server is short. Bowers et al. [11] propose a theoretical framework for designing POR schemes and
provide a prototype implementation of a variant of [28]. In another work, Bowers et al. [10] introduce
HAIL (High-Availability and Integrity Layer), a distributed POR setting where the client’s data are
disseminated across multiple servers. Dodis et al. [17] introduce a notion called “POR codes” and show
how POR schemes can be instantiated based on these POR codes. They explore the connection between
POR codes and the notion of hardness amplification [26]. Xu and Chang [47] improve the privately
verifiable scheme of [41] by making the communication bandwidth required for an audit to be O(λ).
Armknecht et al. [1] propose a POR scheme where any entity among the client (data owner), the auditor
and the cloud server can be malicious, and any two of them can collude as well. The auditor performs
two audits: one for the auditor itself and another on behalf of the client. The challenge sets are generated
using a public randomized algorithm derived from the hash value of the latest block added to the Bitcoin
block chain [34].
A few dynamic POR schemes are there in the literature. Stefanov et al. [44] propose an authenticated
file system called “Iris” that is highly scalable and resilient against a malicious cloud server. Cash et
al. [12] encode a small number of data blocks locally and hide the access pattern of the related (belonging
to the same codeword) blocks from the server using oblivious RAM (ORAM) [23]. Due to the use of
expensive ORAM primitives, this scheme is inefficient. Shi et al. [42] propose two practical dynamic
POR schemes which reduce the cost of computation as well as the communication bandwidth required
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to execute the protocols involved. Chandran et al. [13] introduce the notion of “locally updatable and
locally decodable codes” and propose an efficient dynamic POR scheme by applying the techniques used
in the construction of such a code. Ren et al. [39] propose a dynamic POR scheme for multiple storage
servers where the data file is split into data blocks and each of these data blocks is encoded using intra-
server (erasure coding) and inter-server (network coding) redundancy. An update in a block requires
changing only a few codeword symbols. Moreover, the inter-server redundancy achieved using network
coding reduces the repair bandwidth required in case any of the servers fails. The POR scheme by Guan
et al. [25] exploits the privately verifiable scheme of [41] and gives a publicly verifiable scheme with the
help of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [4,21].
4 Dynamic POR Scheme with Public Verifiability
In this section, we describe our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme with efficient writes and audits.
Like the existing dynamic POR schemes [12,42], our construction also rely on the hierarchical structure
provided by the oblivious RAM [23]. Specifically, we follow a storage structure similar to the one pro-
posed by Shi et al. [42]. However, our construction is more efficient than their scheme in terms of the
cost of a write operation and the cost of an audit. Our construction is based on collision-resistant homo-
morphic hashing technique [30,5] along with a digital signature scheme. To the best of our knowledge,
the homomorphic hashing technique has not been used before in the context of POR schemes.
4.1 Storage Structure for Data Blocks
Our scheme relies on a storage structure similar to that proposed by Shi et al. [42]. Let the client (data
owner) associate a random file-identifier fid of λ bit-size to the data file she wants to outsource to the
cloud server. We assume that the data file is divided into blocks of size β bits, and read (and write)
operations are performed on these blocks. The value of β is taken to be ⌊log p˜⌋ for a large prime p˜. The
way this prime p˜ is selected is discussed in Section 4.1. For static data, a standard way to guarantee
retrievability of the file is to encode the file using an erasure code [41]. The main drawback of using
erasure codes in dynamic POR is that an update in a single block in a codeword (say, C) is followed
by updates on other O(n) blocks in C, where n is the number of blocks being encoded to form C.
The underlying idea to overcome this drawback is not to update the encoded copy (C) for every write
operation (insertion, deletion or modification). Instead, it is updated (or rebuilt) only when sufficient
updates are done on the data file. Thus, the amortized cost for writes is reduced dramatically. However,
this encoded copy stores stale data between two such rebuilds. Therefore, a hierarchical log structure is
maintained which temporarily stores values for the intermediate writes between two successive rebuilds
of C. Each level of this hierarchical log is also encoded using an erasure code.
We adopt the storage structure and code construction mentioned above in our scheme. However,
we use collision-resistant homomorphic hashing to construct another hierarchical storage (discussed in
Section 4.2) in order to reduce the cost of a write and an audit for the client. Our scheme involves the
following three data structures in order to store the data blocks of the client’s file:
– an unencoded buffer U containing all the up-to-date data blocks of the file (that is, U is updated
after every write operation is performed),
– an encoded buffer C which is updated after every n writes (that is, C is rebuilt afresh by encoding
the latest U after every n write operations), and
– an encoded hierarchical (multiple levels of buffers) log structure H which accommodates all interme-
diate writes between two successive rebuilds of C (H is made empty after every n writes).
We note that all of these data structures are stored on the cloud server. The server also stores two
additional data structures, H˜ and C˜ (similar to H and C, respectively), for authentication tags described
in Section 4.2.
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Structure of Buffer U The buffer U contains an up-to-date copy of the data file. Reads and writes
are performed directly on the required locations of U. A Merkle hash tree is maintained over the data
blocks of U to check the authenticity of the read block (see Section 2.3 for the description of a Merkle
hash tree). The Merkle proof sent by the server along with the read block is verified with respect to the
up-to-date root-digest (say, digMHT ) of the Merkle hash tree. One can also use other authenticated
data structures like rank-based authenticated skip lists [19] instead of a Merkle hash tree. Let n be the
number of blocks the client outsources to the cloud server initially. So the height of the Merkle tree built
on U is ⌈logn⌉. Read and write operations on the buffer U are described in details in Section 4.3.
Structure of Hierarchical Log H A hierarchical log structure H is maintained that consists of (k+1)
levels H0,H1, . . . ,Hk, where k = ⌊logn⌋. The log structure H stores the intermediate writes temporarily.
For each 0 6 l 6 k, the l-th level Hl = (Xl, Yl) consists of an encoded copy of 2
l data blocks using a
(2l+1, 2l, 2l)-erasure code, where Xl and Yl contain 2
l blocks each. The original data blocks encoded in
Hl arrive at time t, t + 1, . . . , t + 2
l − 1 (mod n), where t is a multiple of 2l. We describe the encoding
procedure as follows.
Let p˜ be a large prime such that p˜ = α ·(2n)+1 for some α ∈ N and the bit-size of a block β = ⌊log p˜⌋,
where β ≫ λ. Let g˜ denote a generator of Z∗p˜. Then, ω = g˜
α mod p˜ is a 2n-th primitive root of unity
modulo p˜. When a block B is written to H, it is inserted in the topmost level (l = 0) if H0 is empty.
That is, X0 is set to B. In addition, Y0 is set to B · ω
ψ(t) for the t-th ( mod n) write, where ω is the
2n-th primitive root of unity modulo p˜. Here, ψ(·) is the bit reversal function, where ψ(t) is the value of
the binary string obtained by reversing the binary representation of t.
If the top i levels H0,H1, . . . ,Hi−1 are already full, a rebuild is performed to accommodate all the
blocks in these levels as well as the new block in Hi (and to make all the levels up to Hi−1 empty). Shi
et al. [42] employ a fast incrementally constructible code based on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [8]1.
Fig. 3 describes the algorithm for rebuild of Xl that in turn uses the algorithm mix shown in Fig. 4.
Although the algorithm deals with Xl, the same algorithm can be used for rebuilding Yl if we replace the
X arrays by corresponding Y arrays and the incoming block B by B ·ωψ(t). We refer [42] for the form of
the (2l× 2l+1) generator matrix Gl for the l-th level code. Let x˜l be the vector containing 2
l data blocks
most recently inserted in H (after applying a permutation). Then, the output of the algorithm mix for
Hl is the same as that when x˜l is multiplied by Gl. Any (2
l × 2l) submatrix of the generator matrix Gl
is full rank, and thus, the code achieves the maximum distance separable (MDS) property.
As a concrete example, the rebuild of X3 is demonstrated in Fig. 5. The other part of H3 (that
is, Y3) is rebuilt in a similar fashion. We observe that, by using this code, the rebuild cost of Hl is
O(β · 2l) (i.e., linear in the length of Hl) since the algorithm mix populates Hl by combining two arrays
Hl−1,H
′
l−1 ∈ Z
2l−1
p˜ (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). The l-th level is rebuilt after 2
l writes. Therefore, the
amortized cost for rebuilding is O(β logn) per write operation. Each rebuild of the buffer C (discussed
in Section 4.1) is followed by making all levels of H empty.
Structure of Buffer C Unlike the buffer U (and H), no read or write operations are performed directly
on the buffer C. After n write operations, the buffer U is encoded using an erasure code to form a new
copy of C, and the existing copy of C is replaced by this new one. The rebuild of C can be done using
the same FFT-based code discussed in Section 4.1 which costs O(βn log n) both in time and bandwidth.
As C is rebuilt after every n write operations, the cost incurred per write is O(β logn). We note that C
contains stale data between two successive rebuilds. However, the intermediate writes are accommodated
in H with appropriate encoding. Thus, these blocks written between two successive rebuilds of C are also
retrievable at any point of time.
1 We can use any linear-time encodable and decodable error-correcting code [43] instead of the FFT-based code.
However, as we compare the performance of our scheme with that of the “state-of-the-art” publicly verifiable
scheme of [42] in Section 6, we use similar code and parameters for the ease of comparison.
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Rebuild algorithm for Xl to accommodate B in H
Input: Already full levels X0, X1, . . . , Xl−1 and empty Xl.
Output: Empty levels X0, X1, . . . , Xl−1 and rebuilt Xl.
• X ′1 ← mix(X0, B, 0)
• For i = 1 to l − 1 do
X ′i+1 ← mix(Xi, X ′i , i)
• Make X0, X1, . . . , Xl−1 empty and output Xl = X ′l
Fig. 3. Rebuild algorithm for Xl.
Algorithm mix(A0, A1, l)
Input: Two arrays A0, A1 ∈ Z2lp˜ .
Output: Array A of length 2l+1.
• Let ωl = ω2n/2l+1 be the 2l+1-th primitive root of unity modulo p˜
• For i = 0 to 2l − 1 do
A[i]← A0[i] + ωilA1[i] (mod p˜) (1)
A[i+ 2l]← A0[i]− ωilA1[i] (mod p˜) (2)
• Output A
Fig. 4. Algorithm mix for two arrays A0 and A1.
4.2 Storage Structure for Authentication Tags Corresponding to Data Blocks
We note that each data block in U, H and C is of size β = ⌊log p˜⌋ bits for a large prime p˜ = α · (2n) + 1
for some α ∈ N. Thus, the size of a data block β ≫ λ, where λ is the security parameter. For example,
β is taken to be 64 KB and λ is taken to be 128 bits in our scheme (see Table 2 in Section 6). In
addition to the log structure H and the buffer C, two similar structures H˜ and C˜ for authentication tags
corresponding to the blocks in H and C (respectively) are stored on the cloud server. Thus, the server
stores U, H, C, H˜ and C˜. The benefits of storing H˜ and C˜ on the server are as follows.
Let us assume that the authentication tags for data blocks have the following properties.
1. The size of a tag is much less than that of a block.
2. The tags are homomorphic in the sense that, given the tags of two blocks B1 and B2, the tag on any
linear combination of B1 and B2 can be generated.
We note that the fundamental operation for a write (or rebuild) on H and C is to encode data blocks,
that is, to compute a linear combination of those data blocks (see Eqn. 1 and Eqn. 2 in Fig. 4). Due the
second property mentioned above, while the server itself performs write operations on H and C, the client
(data owner) can perform similar operations on H˜ and C˜. On the other hand, due to the first property,
the bandwidth required between the client and the server for a write operation decreases significantly
as the client now has to download much smaller tags instead of large data blocks. The cost of storage is
less nowadays, whereas bandwidth is more expensive and often limited. Therefore, it is reasonable if we
trade the storage off to reduce the communication bandwidth between the client and the server required
for a write (or rebuild).
Indeed, the authentication tags (described in the following section) we use in our dynamic POR
scheme satisfy the following properties.
– The size of a tag is O(λ) and is independent of the size of a data block β, where λ≪ β.
– The homomorphic property is achieved by using a collision-resistant homomorphic hash function.
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Fig. 5. Rebuild process for X3. (a) Initially, the levels X0, X1 and X2 are already full, and X3 is empty. The
rebuild algorithm starts after a new block B arrives. It forms temporary levels X ′1, X
′
2 and X
′
3 using the algorithm
mix. Linear mixing of blocks are shown using black arrows (Eqn. 1) and red arrows (Eqn. 2). (b) Finally, the
levels X0, X1 and X2 are made empty, and X3 = X
′
3 is the newly rebuilt level.
Apart from efficient write operations, the cost of an audit in our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme
is comparable to that in the privately verifiable scheme of [42], and it is much less than that in the
publicly verifiable scheme discussed in the same work.
Generation of Authentication Tags Setup For the data file identified by fid, the client runs an
algorithm Setup(1λ) to set parameters for generating authentication tags. The algorithm Setup selects
two random primes p and q such that |q| = λq = 2λ+ 1, |p| = λp = O(λ) and q|(p− 1). Now, it divides
each block B of the data file into segments of size (λq − 1) bits each. This ensures that each segment is
less than q and can therefore be represented as an element of Zq. Thus, m = ⌈β/(λq − 1)⌉ is the number
of segments in a block, where a block is β = ⌊log p˜⌋ bits long. In this setting, each block B can be
represented as a vector [b1, b2, . . . , bm] ∈ Z
m
q .
Let Gq be a subgroup of Z
∗
p having order q. That is, Gq consists of the order q elements in Zp.
Then, m random elements g1, g2, . . . , gm
R
←− Gq are selected. Let S = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) be a digital
signature scheme (see Section 2.4) where the algorithm Sign takes messages in {0, 1}∗ as input and
outputs signatures of size O(λ) bits each. Let the pair of signing and verification keys for S be (ssk, psk).
The Setup algorithm outputs the primes p and q, the secret key SK = ssk, the public parameters
PK = (g1, g2, . . . , gm, fid, psk), and the descriptions of Gq and S.
Format of a Tag The client computes the homomorphic hash [30,5] on a block B = [b1, b2, . . . , bm] ∈
Zmq as
h(B) =
m∏
i=1
gi
bi mod p. (3)
Using the signature scheme S, the client generates the final authentication tag for the block B as
h˜(B) = (h(B), Signssk(h(B), fid, addr, t)),
where addr is the physical address B is written to (at time t) and fid is the file-identifier of the data
file the block B belongs to.
Collision-resistance and Homomorphic Properties As shown in [5,30], given that the discrete
logarithm assumption (see Section 2.5) holds in Gq, it is computationally hard to find two blocks B1 and
B2 such that B1 6= B2 and h(B1) = h(B2) (collision-resistance property).
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On the other hand, given B1 = [b11, b12, . . . , b1m] ∈ Z
m
q and B2 = [b21, b22, . . . , b2m] ∈ Z
m
q , any linear
combination of B1 and B2 can be written as B = α1B1+α2B2 = [α1b11+α2b21, α1b12+α2b22, . . . , α1b1m+
α2b2m] ∈ Z
m
q . Therefore, h(B) can be computed as
∏m
i=1 gi
α1b1i+α2b2i mod p = h(B1)
α1 · h(B2)
α2
(homomorphic property).
Size of a Tag The size of an authentication tag h˜(B) is the sum of |h(B)| (which is λp = O(λ) bits) and
the size of a signature in S. If we use the standard ECDSA signature scheme [27] as S, then a signature
is 4λ bits long2. Thus, |h˜(B)| is also O(λ) bits. For the values of different parameters considered in our
scheme (see Table 2 in Section 6), the size of a tag is only 192 bytes which is very small compared to the
size of a block (64 KB).
Improvement in Cost of Tag Computation To compute the homomorphic hash h(B) on a block
B using Eqn. 3, it requires m exponentiations and (m− 1) multiplications modulo p. We can reduce this
computational complexity in the following way at the cost of the client storing m elements of Z∗q which is
essentially equivalent to just one block. The client chooses g
R
←− Gq and γ1, γ2, . . . , γm
R
←− Z∗q . The client
sets gi = g
γi mod p for each i ∈ [1,m]. The client includes the vector Γ = [γ1, γ2, . . . , γm] and g in her
secret key SK and makes g1, g2, . . . , gm public as before. Now, the homomorphic hash h(B) on a block
B is computed as
h(B) =
m∏
i=1
gγibi mod p
= g
∑m
i=1
γibi mod p (4)
which requires only one exponentiation modulo p along with m multiplications and (m − 1) additions
modulo q. This is a huge improvement in the cost for computing an authentication tag. On the other
hand, the storage overhead at the client’s side is |Γ | which is same as the size of a single block B.
Considering the fact that the client outsources millions of blocks to the cloud server, this amount of
client storage is reasonable for all practical purposes.
Storage Structure for H˜ and C˜ The storage structures for H˜ and C˜ are exactly the same as those
for H and C, respectively, except that the authentication tags (instead of data blocks) are stored in H˜
and C˜ (see Section 4.1 for structures of H and C).
4.3 Operations
There are three types of operations involved in a dynamic POR scheme. The client can read, write and
audit her data stored on the cloud server. The read and write operations are authenticated in that the
client can verify the authenticity of these operations. We note that though the client herself performs
reads and writes on her data, she can delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor (TPA) for a
publicly verifiable scheme. As our scheme is publicly verifiable, we use the term verifier to denote an
auditor who can be a TPA or the client herself. Fig. 6 gives an overview of the communication flow
between the client and the server during these operations.
Read Reads are performed directly from the unencoded buffer U. The authenticity and freshness of the
block read can be guaranteed by using a Merkle hash tree [33] (or a similar data structure like rank-based
authenticated skip list [19]) over the blocks of U. That is, the blocks of U constitute the leaf-nodes of
the Merkle hash tree (see Section 2.3 for a brief description of a Merkle hash tree). The server sends the
Merkle proof Πread containing the requested block and the labels of the nodes along the associated path
of the tree to the client. The client maintains the up-to-date value of the root-digest of the Merkle hash
tree digMHT and verifies the proof Πread with respect to this root-digest. We note that the size of the
root-digest of the Merkle hash tree is O(λ) bits.
2 To reduce the size of a tag, we can use short signatures of size 2λ bits [9]. However, the verification of a
signature is more expensive due to computation of bilinear pairings [20].
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Fig. 6. Communication flow between the client and the server for different operations described in Section 4.3.
In the setup phase, the client sets parameters for the scheme and outsources the preprocessed file to the server.
Initially, the client uploads U, C and C˜. The server stores them along with H and H˜ that are initialized to be
empty. Then, the client can perform reads, writes and audits on her data in an interleaved fashion. We note
that, during a write, the server itself rebuilds H and C (if necessary). On the other hand, the client rebuilds H˜
and C˜ by downloading some of the authentication tags from them, computing the tag on the new block (using
homomorphic property of tags) and sending the new tag to the server. As our scheme is publicly verifiable, audits
can be performed by a third party auditor (TPA) as well.
Write Let updtype denote the type of a write operation which can be insertion of a new block after
the i-th block, deletion of the i-th block or modification of the i-th block. A write operation affects the
buffers in the following way.
– Write on U As the buffer U is unencoded, a write operation on U can be performed in a similar
way as done on the data blocks in a dynamic provable data possession (PDP) scheme [19]. We briefly
describe the procedure as follows.
Let digMHT be the root-digest of the current Merkle hash tree which is stored at the client’s side.
The client performs an authenticated read on the i-th data block of U (as described above). If the
associated Merkle proof Πread does not match with digMHT , the client aborts. Otherwise, she
computes, from Πread, the value that would be the new root-digest (say, digMHTnew) if the write
operation is correctly performed on U stored at the server. The client stores digMHTnew temporarily
at her end and asks the server to perform the write on U. The server performs this write operation
on U, computes the root-digest digMHTserver of the Merkle hash tree and sends digMHTserver to
the client. The client verifies whether
digMHTnew
?
= digMHTserver. (5)
If they are not equal, the client aborts. Otherwise, the client sets digMHT = digMHTnew at her
end.
– Write on H and H˜ We assume that deletion of a block in U corresponds to insertion of a block
(with null content) in the hierarchical log H. Therefore, for a write of any updtype (i.e., insertion,
deletion or modification), only insertions take place in H. The way a (possibly encoded) block B is
inserted in H is discussed in details in Section 4.1. The cloud server itself performs this operation on
H.
An insertion in H˜ is performed by the client herself as this procedure requires the knowledge of secret
information held by the client. The client computes the authentication tag on the (possibly encoded)
block and insert it in H˜. The underlying basic operation of the rebuild phase of H is to compute a
linear combination B (e.g., α1B1 + α2B2) of two blocks B1 and B2 (see Eqn. 1 and 2 in Fig. 4).
Similarly, the corresponding operation for the rebuild of H˜ is to compute h˜(B) given h˜(B1) and
12
h˜(B2). For i = 1, 2, the client first downloads h˜(Bi) and verifies the signature on h(Bi) by checking
whether
Verifypsk((h(Bi), fid, addri, ti), h˜(Bi))
?
= accept,
where psk is the verification key for the signature scheme S. We note that addr1 (or addr2) is the
physical address of the block B1 (or B2) written at time t1 (or t2), and fid is the file-identifier of
the data file the block B belongs to. For any block in H and C, the time when the block was written
most recently can be easily computed from the current time itself. If the verification passes, the client
computes h(B) = h(B1)
α1 · h(B2)
α2 and h˜(B) subsequently. This requires two exponentiations and
one multiplication modulo p along with one Sign and two Verify operations.
– Write on C and C˜ As mentioned in Section 4.1, C (C˜ for authentication tags) is rebuilt after
every n writes. The server performs a rebuild on C, whereas a rebuild on C˜ is performed by the
client. Basic operations involved in rebuilds of C and C˜ are the same as those for rebuilds of H and
H˜, respectively, and thus are omitted here.
Audit In the challenge phase, the verifier chooses r = O(λ log n) random locations {addri}16i6r from all
levels (where O(λ) random locations are selected from each level) of H and C. Then, she sends a challenge
set Q = {(νi, addri)}16i6r to the cloud server, where ν1, ν2, . . . , νr
R
←− Z∗q are random coefficients.
In the response phase, the server sends to the verifier a proof containing B∗ =
∑
16i6r νiBaddri and
{h˜(Baddri)}16i6r. Upon receiving the proof from the server, the verifier verifies each of the signatures
on {h(Baddri)}16i6r. Then, she computes h
∗ =
∏
16i6r h(Baddri)
νi and h(B∗) using Eqn. 3. Finally, the
verifier checks whether
h(B∗)
?
= h∗ (6)
and outputs 0 if any of the verifications fails; she outputs 1, otherwise.
5 Security
We define security of a dynamic POR scheme [42,12] and show that our scheme described in Section 4
is secure according to this definition. We also show that the server cannot pass an audit without storing
all data blocks properly, except with some probability negligible in λ.
5.1 Overview of Security of a Dynamic POR Scheme
A dynamic POR scheme must satisfy the following properties [42]. The formal security definition is given
in Section 5.2.
1. Authenticity and Freshness The authenticity property requires that the cloud server cannot
produce valid proofs during audits without storing the corresponding blocks and their respective
authentication information untampered, except with a probability negligible in λ.
For dynamic data, the client can modify an existing data block. However, a malicious cloud server
may discard this change and keep an old copy of the block. As the old copy of the block and its
corresponding tag constitute a valid pair, the client has no way to detect if the cloud server is storing
the fresh (latest) copy. Thus, the client must be convinced that the server has stored the up-to-date
blocks.
2. Retrievability Retrievability of data requires that, given a probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary A that can respond correctly to a challenge Q with some non-negligible probability, there exists
a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract all data blocks of the file (except with
negligible probability) by challenging A for a polynomial (in λ) number of times and verifying the
responses sent by A. The algorithm E has a black-box rewinding access to A. Authenticity and
freshness of data restrict the adversary A to produce valid responses (without storing the data in an
authentic and up-to-date fashion) during these interactions only with some probability negligible in
the security parameter λ.
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5.2 Security Model
We first describe the following security game between the challenger (acting as the client) and the
adversary (acting as the cloud server).
– The adversary selects a file F associated with a file-identifier fid to store. The challenger processes
the file to form another file F ′ and returns F ′ to the adversary. The challenger stores only some
metadata for verification purpose.
– The adversary adaptively chooses a sequence of operations defined by {opi}16i6q1 (q1 is polynomial
in the security parameter λ), where opi is a read, a write or an audit. The challenger executes
these operations on the file stored by the adversary. For each operation, the challenger verifies the
response sent by the adversary and updates the metadata at her end only if the response passes the
verification.
– Let F ∗ be the final state of the file after q1 operations. The challenger has the latest metadata for
the file F ∗. Now, she executes an audit protocol with the adversary. The challenger sends a random
challenge set Q to the adversary, and the adversary returns a cryptographic proof to the challenger.
The adversary wins the game if it passes the verification.
Definition 3 (Security of a Dynamic POR Scheme). A dynamic POR scheme is secure if, given
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can win the security game mentioned above with some
non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract all data
blocks of the file by interacting (via challenge-response) with A polynomially many times.
5.3 Security Analysis of Our Scheme
We state and prove the following theorem in order to analyze the security of our dynamic POR scheme.
Theorem 1. Given that the discrete logarithm assumption holds in Gq and the underlying digital signa-
ture scheme is secure, the dynamic POR scheme described in Section 4 is secure according to Definition 3.
Proof. We use the following claim in order to prove Theorem 1.
Claim. Given that the discrete logarithm assumption holds in Gq and the underlying digital signature
scheme is secure, authenticity and freshness of the challenged blocks in H and C are guaranteed.
Proof. We prove the above claim for the log structure H. The proof for C follows in a similar way. In
our scheme, every block B (of the file identified by fid) in H corresponds to an authentication tag
h˜(B) = (h(B), Signssk(h(B), fid, addr, t)) present in H˜, where the signing algorithm Sign uses the secret
key ssk of the client and t is the last write-time of the block B. Let B be the correct block that was
actually written by the client to the address addr at time t. Suppose this block in addr is challenged
during an audit. We note that the last write-time t of the block is computable from addr and the current
time. So, the values of fid, addr and t are known to the challenger. Therefore, in order to break the
authenticity of the scheme, the PPT adversary A has to find a block B′ 6= B and its tag h˜(B′) such that
one of the following conditions holds:
– Case I: h(B′) 6= h(B) and h˜(B′) = (h(B′), Signssk(h(B
′), fid, addr, t)),
– Case II: h(B′) = h(B).
Case I We show that, if the adversary A can find a block B′ 6= B and its authentication tag h˜(B′)
such that h(B′) 6= h(B) and h˜(B′) = (h(B′), Signssk(h(B
′), fid, addr, t)), then it can break the security
of the underlying signature scheme (the security of a digital signature scheme is discussed in Section 2.4).
Let the adversary A be provided with a set of polynomially many authentication tags {h˜(Bi) =
(h(Bi), Signssk(h(Bi), fid, addri, ti))}i∈I for {(Bi, addri, ti)}i∈I of A’s choice (where I = [1, k] for some
k polynomial in λ). Let us assume that the adversary A is able to find another block B′ and its tag
h˜(B′) = (h(B′), Signssk(h(B
′), fid, addrj , tj)), such that j ∈ I, B
′ 6= Bj and h(B
′) 6= h(Bj). Then, we
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can construct another probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm BOssk(·) that, given the public key
psk and an access to the signing oracle Ossk(·), executes A as a subroutine. Initially, B provides the
public parameters (g1, g2, . . . , gm, fid, psk) and the description of Gq to A. With the help of Ossk(·), B
responds to A’s queries with {h˜(Bi) = (h(Bi), Signssk(h(Bi), fid, addri, ti))}i∈I . Now, if A finds another
block B′ and its tag h˜(B′) = (h(B′), Signssk(h(B
′), fid, addrj , tj)) as described above with probability
ǫA in (polynomial) time t
′
A, then B also finds a forged signature Signssk(h(B
′), fid, addrj , tj) (that was
not queried to the signing oracle before) with probability ǫB = ǫA in time t
′
B ≈ t
′
A.
Case II We show that, if the adversary A can find a block B′ 6= B and its authentication tag
h˜(B′) = (h(B′), Signssk(h(B
′), fid, addr, t)) such that h(B′) = h(B), then it can solve the discrete
logarithm problem over Gq (we refer to [5,30] for the detailed proof showing that the collision-resistance
property holds for h).
The idea of the proof is as follows. Let us assume that the adversary A, given the description of
the multiplicative group Gq = 〈g〉 and m random elements g1, g2, . . . , gm of Gq, is able to find two
blocks B,B′ ∈ Zmq such that B 6= B
′ and h(B) = h(B′). Then, we can construct another probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm B that, given the description of Gq and y ∈ Gq, executes A as a
subroutine to find a collision and uses this collision to compute x ∈ Zq such that y = g
x. In order
to do that, B selects z1, z2, . . . , zm
R
←− {0, 1} and u1, u2, . . . , um
R
←− Zq. For each i ∈ [1,m], B sets
gi = g
ui if zi = 0; it sets gi = y
ui if zi = 1. Then, B provides A with the description of Gq = 〈g〉
and the elements g1, g2, . . . , gm ∈ Gq computed in the previous step. Now, suppose A finds two blocks
B = [b1, b2, . . . , bm] ∈ Z
m
q and B
′ = [b′1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
m] ∈ Z
m
q with probability ǫA in (polynomial) time
t′A, such that B 6= B
′ and h(B) = h(B′). Then, B sets a =
∑
zi=1
ui(bi − b
′
i) mod q and computes
a′ = a−1 mod q (a is non-zero with probability at least 12 ). Since h(B) = h(B
′), we have
m∏
i=1
gbii =
m∏
i=1
g
b′i
i
=⇒
∏
zi=1
yui(bi−b
′
i) =
∏
zi=0
gui(b
′
i−bi)
=⇒ ya =
∏
zi=0
gui(b
′
i−bi)
=⇒ yaa
′
=
∏
zi=0
ga
′ui(b
′
i−bi)
=⇒ y = gx,
where x =
∑
zi=0
a′ui(b
′
i − bi) mod q is the discrete logarithm of y in Gq. Thus, the algorithm B solves the
discrete logarithm problem over Gq with probability ǫB >
ǫA
2 in (polynomial) time t
′
B = t
′
A + O(mλ
3).
The overhead term O(mλ3) is attributed to some arithmetic operations (including m exponentiation
operations) that B has to perform.
Given an address addr, let B be the latest block that was actually written by the client to addr at
time t. Let the challenger challenge the block in addr during an audit. In order to retain an older block
B′ 6= B (written to the same address addr at time t′ < t) and still pass the audit, the adversary A has
to produce its authentication tag for time t (we note that the tag for B′ for time t′ is available to A)
such that one of the conditions mentioned above (Case I and Case II) holds. As we have seen earlier,
it is computationally hard to find such a block B′, except with a probability negligible in λ. Thus, the
adversary must store each of the challenged blocks with its latest content to pass the audit. 
We define a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract all blocks from each of the
levels of H and C (except with negligible probability) by interacting with an adversary A that wins the
security game described in Section 5.2 with some non-negligible probability. As our dynamic POR scheme
satisfies the authenticity and freshness properties mentioned above, the adversary A cannot produce a
valid proof (B∗ =
∑
16i6r νiBaddri , {h˜(Baddri)}16i6r) for a given challenge set Q = {(νi, addri)}16i6r
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without storing the challenged blocks and their corresponding tags properly, except with some negligible
probability (see Section 4.3 and Claim 5.3). This means that if the verifier outputs 1 during the extraction
phase, B∗ in the proof is indeed the linear combination of the untampered blocks {Baddri}16i6r using
coefficients {νi}16i6r.
Suppose that the extractor E wants to extract r blocks indexed by J . It challenges A with a challenge
set Q = {(νi, addri)}i∈J . If the proof is valid (that is, the verifier outputs 1), E initializes a matrix ME
as [ν1i]i∈J , where ν1i = νi for each i ∈ J . The extractor challenges A for the same J but with different
random coefficients. If the verifier outputs 1 and the vector of coefficients is linearly independent to the
existing rows of ME , then E appends this vector to ME as a row. The extractor E runs this procedure
until the matrix ME has r linearly independent rows. So, the final form of the full-rank matrix ME is
[νji]j∈[1,r],i∈J . Consequently, the challenged blocks can be extracted using Gaussian elimination.
Following the way mentioned above, the extractor algorithm E can interact with A (polynomially
many times) in order to extract ρ-fraction of blocks (for some ρ) for each level of H and C by setting
the index set J appropriately. Use of a ρ-rate erasure code ensures retrievability of all blocks of C (i.e.,
all the encoded blocks of U up to the last rebuild of C) and H (i.e., all the encoded blocks of U written
after the last rebuild of C). For each l-th level of H (or C), the FFT-based code used in our scheme is a
(2l+1, 2l, 2l)-erasure code; thus, ρ = 12 .
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
5.4 Probabilistic Guarantees
As we mention in Section 4.3, each of the levels of H and the buffer C is audited with O(λ) random
locations. Due to the use of a (2l+1, 2l, 2l)-erasure code for each level 0 6 l 6 ⌊logn⌋, the server has to
actually delete half of the blocks in a level in order to delete a single block in that level. Thus, if the server
corrupts half of the blocks in any level, then it passes an audit with probability pcheat = (1 −
1
2 )
O(λ) =
2−O(λ) that is negligible in λ.
6 Performance Analysis
We analyze the performance of the following types of operations (described in Section 4.3) involved in
our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme.
– Read For an authenticated read on the data block B present in U, the server sends the correspond-
ing Merkle proof Πread which consists of the block B, the data block in the sibling leaf-node of B
and the hash values along the associated path of the Merkle hash tree (see Section 2.3). Thus, a read
operation takes 2β +O(λ log n) communication bandwidth between the client and the server.
To reduce this cost, the client can generate authentication tags on the data blocks of U (as discussed
in Section 4.2) and construct a Merkle tree over these tags instead of the data blocks. In this setting,
Πread consists of h˜(B), the authentication tag in its sibling leaf-node and the hash values along the
associated path. This reduces the communication bandwidth between the client and the server for a
read to β +O(λ log n).
– Write A write operation incurs the following costs.
• Write on U : A write operation on U involves an authenticated read operation followed by the
verification of Eqn. 5. Thus, each write operation requires β+O(λ logn) bandwidth between the
client and the server (for communicating Πread and digMHTserver).
• Write on H and H˜: The cost of a write on H is O(β logn) (see Section 4.1). Similarly, the cost
of a write on H˜ is O(λ log n) as the blocks are replaced by their authentication tags in H˜ and the
size of a tag is O(λ) bits.
• Write on C and C˜: C (or C˜) is rebuilt after every n writes. As mentioned in Section 4.1, a write
operation on C costs O(β logn) both in time and bandwidth. Similarly, the cost of a write on C˜
is O(λ log n).
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Table 1. Comparison among dynamic POR schemes based on different parameters (asymptotic complexity)
Dynamic
Client
Cost of a write operation Cost of an audit operation
VerifiabilityPOR
storage
Server
Bandwidth
Server
Bandwidth
schemes computation computation
Iris [44] O(β
√
n) O(β) O(β) O(βλ
√
n) O(βλ
√
n) Private
Cash et al. [12] O(β) O(βλ(log n)2) O(βλ(log n)2) O(βλ(log n)2) O(βλ(log n)2) Private
Chandran et al. [13] O(β) O(β(log n)2) O(β(log n)2) O(βλ log n) O(βλ log n) Private
Shi et al. [42]
O(β) O(β log n) β +O(λ log n) O(βλ log n) β +O(λ2 log n) Private
O(βλ) O(β log n) β(1 + ǫ) +O(λ log n)† O(βλ log n) O(βλ log n) Public
Our scheme O(β) O(β log n) β +O(λ log n) O(βλ log n) β +O(λ2 log n) Public
We take λ as the security parameter and n as the number of blocks (each β-bits long) of the data file to be
outsourced to the server. For all of the schemes mentioned above, the storage on the server side is O(βn),
where β ≫ λ. The cost of an authenticated read operation is β+O(λ log n) if a Merkle hash tree is maintained
over the unencoded data blocks for checking authenticity and freshness.
† ǫ is a constant such that ǫ > 0.
– Audit For a challenge set Q containing r = O(λ log n) random locations {addri}16i6r and random
coefficients ν1, ν2, . . . , νr ∈ Z
∗
q , the server computes a proof containing B
∗ =
∑
16i6r νiBaddri and
{h˜(Baddri)}16i6r and sends the proof to the verifier. Thus, the bandwidth required for an audit is
given by β +O(λ2 log n).
Comparison among Dynamic POR Schemes We compare our scheme with other existing dynamic
proofs-of-retrievability (POR) schemes which is summarized in Table 1. The comparison is based on the
asymptotic complexity for different parameters. Some of the figures mentioned in Table 1 are taken
from [42]. Table 2 mentions typical values of the parameters used in our scheme [30].
From Table 1, we note that, in our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme, bandwidths required
for a write and an audit are given by β +O(λ log n) and β +O(λ2 logn), respectively. These figures are
asymptotically the same as those in the privately verifiable scheme of [42]. On the other hand, this is a
significant improvement over the publicly verifiable scheme of [42] where bandwidths required for a write
and an audit are β(1 + ǫ) +O(λ log n) and O(βλ log n), respectively, for a constant ǫ > 0 and β ≫ λ.
Additionally, one drawback of the publicly verifiable scheme proposed by Shi et al. [42] is due to
the fact that one or more Merkle hash trees (separate from the Merkle hash tree3 maintained for U)
are maintained to ensure the integrity of the blocks in the hierarchical log H (one for the entire log or
one for each of its levels). To enable a third party auditor (TPA) to audit the data blocks residing at
different levels of this log, the root-digests of these trees need to be made public. However, some of these
root-digests are changed as often as new data blocks are inserted in the hierarchical log structure, thus
resulting in a change in the public parameters for each write. This incurs an additional (non-trivial)
overhead for validation and certification of the public parameters for every write operation. On the other
hand, the public parameters in our publicly verifiable dynamic POR scheme are fixed throughout the
execution of the protocols involved.
Apart from the schemes listed in Table 1, we mention some POR schemes proposed recently that
handle data dynamics as follows. The dynamic POR scheme proposed by Guan et al. [25] uses the notion
of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [4,21] to construct a publicly verifiable POR scheme from the
privately verifiable scheme of Shacham and Waters [41]. It also handles dynamic data using a “modified
B+ Merkle tree”. However, the iO candidates available in the literature are not currently practical. Ren
3 We note that, in our scheme as well as in [42], a Merkle hash tree is maintained for the unencoded buffer
U. However, as U is not audited (its authenticity is checked only by the client during a read or write) by a
third party auditor, the client keeps the root-digest of this Merkle hash tree (for U) private avoiding frequent
updates in the public parameters.
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Table 2. Typical values of the parameters used
Parameter Description of parameter Value
λ Security parameter (in bits) 128
λp Size of prime p (in bits) 1024
λq Size of prime q (in bits) 257
β Size of a data block (in KB) 64
m
⌈β/(λq − 1)⌉ 128
= number of segments in a block
et al. [39] propose a dynamic POR scheme where the data file is encoded using erasure coding (intra-
server encoding) and network coding (inter-server encoding). The encoded blocks are then disseminated
among multiple storage servers. Use of network coding reduces the communication bandwidth required
for a repair in case of a node (server) failure. For the intra-server encoding, each block is divided into
some sub-blocks (using an erasure code), and a “range-based 2-3 tree” (rb23Tree) is built upon these
sub-blocks for each server. This ensures the authenticity and freshness properties of the blocks within a
server. We note that each block is encoded (locally) into a few number of sub-blocks for the intra-server
encoding. Therefore, an update in a block (or in any of its sub-blocks) requires updating only a few
sub-blocks corresponding to that block. This makes an update in this scheme efficient. On the other
hand, a malicious server needs to delete only a few sub-blocks to actually make a block unavailable.
Thus, the dynamic POR scheme proposed by Ren et al. [39] differs from our scheme on the basis of the
granularity of data the client needs.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a dynamic POR scheme where the client can update her data file after
the initial outsourcing of the file to the cloud server and retrieve all of her data at any point of time.
Our scheme is publicly verifiable, that is, anyone having the knowledge of the public parameters of the
scheme can perform an audit on the client’s behalf, and it offers security guarantees of a dynamic POR
scheme. This scheme is more efficient (in terms of the cost of a write or an audit) than other practical
and publicly verifiable dynamic POR schemes with a similar data granularity.
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